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REPLY TO STANDARD OF REVIEW.
An overriding issue in this litigation is whether the trial court improperly based its

evaluation of New Bingham Mary Mining Company ("New Bingham") shares on what
might have happened to the company but for actions of the company's management in
alleged violation of its duties to the minority shareholders. This Court owes no deference
to the trial court on that issue. As the Utah Supreme Court said in Hogle v. Zinetics
Medical Inc., 63 P.3d 80, 84 (Utah 2002), m[W]hile the ultimate determination of fair
value is a question of fact, the determination of whether a given fact or circumstance is
relevant to fair value under [state law] is a question of law which we review de novo*"
(Citations omitted.)
Groesbecks argue frequently for deference to the trial court because of its
opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. In this litigation there were actually
very few eyewitnesses with memories of the pertinent events because those events
occurred so many years ago. Many of the court's factual determinations were based on
documentary evidence.

To the extent that the trial court's findings were based on

documentary evidence this Court has recognized that it is "in as good a position as the
trial court to examine the evidence de novo and determine the facts." In re Adoption of
Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988); see also, Bench v. Bechtel
Civil Minerals, Inc., 758 P.2d 460, 461 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988).
Although Groesbecks discuss various standards of review surrounding the
interpretation of the 1979 Mining Lease ("the Lease"), they do not provide the standard
for review of a finding in the first instance that a contract is ambiguous. This Court has
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previously held that whether a written document is ambiguous is a question of law,
reviewed for correctness. Oliphant v. Estate of Brunetti, 64 P.3d 587, 591 (Ut Ct. App.
2002).

II.

REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS,
In their statement of facts at pages 6-7, Groesbecks describe the process of open

pit mining. Appellant has previously done the same and will not repeat that here. One
aspect of Groesbecks' description, however, merits a response. Groesbecks describe
"stripping" as a process of removing waste with no ore material therein, to provide access
to ore contained in properties located closer to the center of the open pit mine. Brief of
Appellees, p. 6. The description in the abstract is fine, but is misleadmg if construed to
apply to the facts of this case. The Bingham open pit mine contains two types of ore,
skam ore located deep underground, and disseminated porphyry ore generally spread
throughout the property. R. 1192, pp. 83-84. Kennecott did in fact mine disseminated
ore from the New Bingham claims and New Bingham was credited with royalties for that
ore pursuant to the Lease. Ex. 23. In addition, the appraisals of both parties' experts
credited New Bingham with revenues for disseminated ore scheduled to be mined in the
future. In the years when no ore was encountered or anticipated to be encountered, New
Bingham was credited with the $25,000 annual advance royalty payment called for by the
Lease.

Further, under the investment value portion of Groesbecks' appraisal,

Groesbecks' experts included in their $3.50 per share valuation the quantity of deep skarn
ore believed to exist on the New Bingham claims. In order to reach that ore either the
surface of the New Bingham claims would have to be removed, or an underground mine,

which does not currently exist, would have to be constructed by Kennecott to reach it.
Under the former scenario, removal of the surface of the New Bingham claims not only
serves to recover disseminated porphyry ore on those claims, but also could provide
access to the deep skarn ore which Groesbecks have included in their value calculation.
For these reasons it is not accurate to suggest that Kennecott's activities on the New
Bingham claims benefited only Kennecott.
Groesbecks in their brief criticize appellant's appraiser for his reliance on
information provided by Kennecott. Their criticism ignores the fact that appellant's
appraisal was based entirely on the present value of royalties anticipated from future
mining, from which were deducted certain costs, all of which can only come from
Kennecott. Groesbecks5 experts relied on the very same information for the very same
reasons in preparing the investment value portion of their two-part appraisal. The parties'
experts disagreed in their investment value appraisal primarily on the basis of metal
prices and discount rate, two variables on which reasonable minds can differ. In the final
analysis, the only real difference between the two appraisals is Groesbecks' addition of a
tenfold increase in value to account for "stripping rights."
Groesbecks make reference at page 8 of their brief to potential agreements
apparently discussed but never consummated (one of them 30 years prior to the trial!) by
which New Bingham would have granted Kennecott stripping rights on New Bingham
property. Those references are red herrings. At the time of those discussions New
Bingham had no means by which to earn income from its claims. An agreement like
those proposed would have provided New Bingham an opportunity for income. Those
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circumstances changed in 1979 when Newr Bingham conveyed by lease to Anaconda the
right to enter on and mine its property, and to engage in related operations. No separate
"stripping rights" agreement was ever signed. Although Groesbecks deride the Lease as
a "sweetheart deal" (Brief of Appellees, p. 18), once they lost their fight to oppose the
Lease, they twice accepted dividends funded by royalties paid pursuant to the Lease. R.
1124.
III.

GROESBECKS' ARGUMENT FAILS TO RECONCILE KENNECOTT'S
RIGHTS UNDER THE MINING LEASE WITH THE COURT'S
EVALUATION.
In its opening brief appellant discussed at some length the inconsistency inherent

in the court's ruling, which recognized Kennecott's right to mine the surface of the New
Bingham claims, but not if it meant expanding the Kennecott pit. Groesbecks failed to
respond to the argument or to reconcile the inconsistency.
The trial court ruled in its Memorandum Decision "that the Lease and assignment
thereof included stripping rights . . . ." R. 1138. Stripping is nothing more than the
removal of the surface of the earth. Sometimes the material removed contains enough
mineral to be characterized as ore. Sometimes it does not, and it is characterized as
waste. Some of the material removed from the New Bingham claims by Kennecott was
waste. Some of it was ore for which New Bingham was paid royalties. It is obviously
not possible to remove the surface of the ground without the pit getting larger. As the pit
gets larger, more ore is exposed. Some of the ore was Kennecott's ore. Some of the ore
was New Bingham's ore. It was not possible for Kennecott to exercise the rights granted
by the Lease to mine the surface of the New Bingham property without at the same time

A

exposing more of Kennecott's own ore. That being the case, there is no factual or legal
basis for the trial court's apparent distinction between removal of the surface for the
purpose of mining, or for the purpose of expanding the pit to access other ore, because
the two occur simultaneously, as they necessarily must.
IV.

THE COURT DID NOT FOLLOW AN APPROVED METHODOLOGY
FOR THE APPRAISAL OF NEW BINGHAM SHARES.
Both parties acknowledge that to determine fair value under Utah Code Ann. §16-

10a-1330(1) courts consider asset value, market value, and investment value. In its
appraisal plaintiff employed investment value methodology to determine the present
value of New Bingham's only income, the stream of revenues paid under the Lease, and
to arrive at a value of $ 1.10 per share.
Groesbecks are unable to articulate the methodology they employed. If it is the
investment value methodology, then their calculated value of the New Bingham shares
was $3.50 per share. That is the value Groesbecks' experts placed on the mining lease
revenue using exactly the same investment value methodology and data from the
Kennecott mining department that appellant used, differing from the analysis conducted
by appellant primarily in the fact that different metal prices and a different discount rate
were used. Ex. 126. That methodology conforms to the requirements of law. If it had
been the basis for the evaluation of the New Bingham shares, the methodology would not
have been objectionable.
Groesbecks then went on, however, to argue that additional value should be added
because of the impact of past management decisions, years before the merger and
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unrelated to it, in alleged violation of management's fiduciary duties. The addition of
this latter component of value cannot in any way be considered part of the investment
value methodology. The parameters of the investment value methodology are clear and
unambiguous. The investment value approach estimates the corporation's future earning
capacity.

Oakridge Energy, Inc., v. Clifton. 937 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1997).

The

investment value method consists of two steps. Id. First, recent earnings history is used
to establish an average annual earnings figure. Id. Second, a capitalization ratio or
earnings multiplier is chosen.

Id.

Investment value equals the product of the

capitalization ratio and the average earnings figure. Id. There is no place for breach of
fiduciary duty claims in the investment value formula.
Similarly, the breach of fiduciary duty claims cannot fit within the confines of the
asset value methodology. The asset value methodology is appropriate when a company is
undergoing liquidation such that asset value can reasonably be measured.

Hogle v.

Zinetics Medical Inc., 63 P.3d 80, 86 (Utah 2002). The Hogle court noted that absent
actual liquidation a company must be valued as a going concern. Id. There was no
liquidation process occurring in the instant action and thus asset value is not an
appropriate valuation methodology for the Groesbecks' shares.
Nonetheless, Groesbecks appear to suggest that they are simultaneously also
employing the asset value methodology when they argue at page 21 of their brief that
New Bingham's assets at the time of the merger included claims for breaches of fiduciary
duty or, alternatively, the mining claims unencumbered by the Lease. Groesbecks further
contend that the trial court was entitled to follow such an approach because of case law

holding that "where the fair value of shares is affected by claims for breach of fiduciary
duty, those claims can and must be considered in an appraisal proceeding." Brief of
Appellees, p. 21.
Leaving aside for the moment the inherent inconsistency in awarding $3.50 per
share for the present value of the lease revenues, and additionally awarding value for the
claims unencumbered by the Lease, Groesbecks' approach neither comports with reality
nor is it supported by the case law they cite.
There is no evidence and no finding that New Bingham ever recognized as an
asset a legal cause of action. Such a shareholder derivative claim was never raised at any
time during the life of the corporation. There is no expert or other testimony purporting
to evaluate the merits and value of such a potential legal cause of action. Rather, the only
other evaluation evidence was the value of ore that Kennecott would have access to by
virtue of mining on the New Bingham claims, to which a royalty or purchase price
percentage was applied.
With regard to Groesbecks5 alternative characterization, the reality is that the
claims were encumbered by the Lease as of the day immediately prior to the merger.
Contrary to Groesbecks' representation (Brief of Appellees, p. 19) the court did not rule
that the Lease was void. See R. 1141, Tflf 25, 57. Although Groesbecks argue that the
Lease could have or should have been terminated, it was not. Although in the course of
this sizeable transaction, Kennecott and Anaconda initially overlooked the assignment
and consent provisions, those documents were eventually obtained and the Lease was
never terminated by New Bingham management for reasons appellant explained in its
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opening brief.
Groesbecks justify their unorthodox approach based upon cases discussed at pages
21 through 24 of their brief. In none of those cases did the court conclude that a cause of
action unasserted at the time of the merger was an asset to be included in the appraisal.
Rather, in those cases where the court looked into the management of the corporation, it
was always prompted to do so by allegations that management's activities in question
were done in anticipation of the merger with the intent of depressing the stock price to be
paid in the merger. In none of those cases did the court review management actions
unrelated to the merger for decisions that impacted the value of the company.
In discussing the New York case of Walter J. Schloss Assoc, v. Arkwin Ind., Inc.,
455 N.Y.S.2d 844 (N.Y. App. 1982), the Groesbecks quote the dissenting opinion
(dissenting opinion adopted on certiorari review by Court of Appeals, 460 N.E.2d 1090
(N.Y. 1984)) in support of their argument for inclusion of breach of fiduciary duty
allegations in appraisal proceedings:
An action for damages alone will not lie, since this would
allow a dissenting shareholder, by merely alleging fraudulent
or unlawful corporate conduct, to seek therein the identical
relief available to him in appraisal proceedings. For example,
where, as here, there is "a forced liquidation or sale of the
minority shareholder's stock incident to a merger," the full
and proper monetary recovery of the fair value of dissenters'
shares may be obtained in appraisal proceedings in which the
discharge of the majority's fiduciary duty to the minority can
be weighed in determining fair value.
Id. at 851-52 (emphasis added). The key language used by the Schloss court is "incident
to a merger." The defendant majority stockholder in Schloss deliberately refrained from

Q

declaring any dividends in 1979 after a run up in sales and profits. Id. at 845. The
merger at issue occurred immediately thereafter in 1980. Id. The failure to declare a
dividend in 1979, which depressed the share price, subsequently negatively impacted the
minority shareholders when the merger occurred in 1980. The breach of fiduciary duty
was "incident to the merger."
The Groesbecks next cite to the California case of Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 729
P.2d 683 (Cal. 1986). In discussing the appraisal proceeding process, the Steinberg court
looked to the Sturgeon case. See Sturgeon Petroleums, Ltd. v. Merchants Petroleum Co.,
147 Cal.App.3d 134, 195 Cal. Rptr 29 (1983).

In discussing Sturgeon, the court

described the holding in Sturgeon that "a shareholder may litigate his claim of
misconduct in an appraisal proceeding, and to the extent he is able to prove that the value
of the shares was diminished by misconduct in connection with the merger, his
recovery could be adjusted in that proceeding." Id. at 690 (quoting Sturgeon at 147 Cal.
App. 3d 134, 141, 195 Cal. Rptr. 29) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Steinberg
court's holding was:
We conclude that at least in a case such as this, where the
plaintiff was aware of all the facts leading to his cause of
action for alleged misconduct in connection with the term of
the merger prior to the time the merger was consummated
but deliberately opted to sue for damage instead of seeking an
appraisal, section 1312(a) [California Corporations Code] acts
as a bar.
Id. at 694. (emphasis added). Similar to the language in Schloss above, the key language
in Steinberg is "in connection with the term of the merger."
The Groesbecks go on to claim that the Indiana Supreme Court requires a minority
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shareholder to "present claims for breach of fiduciary duty in a statutory appraisal
proceeding." (Brief of Appellees, p. 22.) The Groesbecks' analysis of Indiana law is
flawed. See Fleming v. Int'l Pizza Supply Corp., 676 N.E.2d 1051 (Ind. 1997). The
court's language in Fleming is clear:
[W]e think the defendants are correct in their argument that,
in a merger or asset sale, the exclusive remedy available to a
shareholder seeking payment for the value of the
shareholder's shares is the statutory appraisal procedure. We
believe the legislature clearly and unambiguously made the
determination that separate actions would not lie for breach of
fiduciary duty and fraud....
Id. at 1056-57. The court further explained its rationale for the aforementioned quote in
footnote no. 9 by stating:
We believe that it is equally clear that the BCL [Indiana
Business Corporation Law] did not intend to restrict any
claims of wrongdoing that a corporation or shareholder brings
before the corporate action creating dissenters' rights occurs.
For example, if an officer had stolen money from the
corporation prior to a merger, the corporation (or a
shareholder on the corporation's behalf) would have a claim
(or a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation) to recover
the money from the officer. If such a claim is not yet
resolved at the time the fair value of the dissenters' shares is
established, the corporation's claim should be valued like any
other asset of the corporation.
Id at 57,

The court's explanation in footnote 9 delineates a fiduciary duty claim

rightfully brought as a derivative suit, as opposed to inclusion in a statutory appraisal
procedure, unless the breach of fiduciary duty claim is pending and remains unresolved at
the time of the valuation of the dissenter's shares. Moreover, as discussed in footnote 1
of appellants' opening brief, the breach of fiduciary duty claims in Fleming occurred in

in

the same year as the appraisal proceeding. In the instant action, no breach of fiduciary
duty claim "remained unresolved" because none had ever been brought in the first place.
Simply put, there was no breach of fiduciary duty claim outstanding that could be valued
as an asset.
In discussing Delaware law, the Groesbecks again allege that breach of fiduciary
duty claims are allowed in a statutory appraisal proceeding. Brief of Appellees, p. 23.
To the contrary, Delaware law stands for the proposition that breach of fiduciary duty
claims are not properly raised in the statutory appraisal proceeding unless they have some
relation to the merger. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), material
information which was directly related to the merger in question was withheld from
minority shareholders such that the minority shareholder vote was not an informed one,
amounting to what the court deemed a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the majority
shareholders. Id. at 703. The crux of the Weinberger case was whether or not the
majority shareholders' failure to disclose a feasibility study (prepared in anticipation of
the merger) to the minority shareholders amounted to "a matter of material significance"
such that a breach of fiduciary duty occurred. Id. at 709. The court stated that "the
limited function of the [Chancery] court was to determine whether defendants had
disclosed all information in their possession germane to the transaction at issue [the
merger]." Id. at 710 (emphasis added). The feasibility study was commissioned by
directors who sat on the boards of both the acquiring and selling corporations. Id. The
feasibility study was completed in anticipation of the merger to determine the maximum
price that should be offered by the acquiring company. Id. By failing to provide this
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clearly material information to the minority shareholders, a breach of fiduciary duty
occurred directly related to the merger.
The Groesbecks further note that the Delaware Supreme Court comments that
during an appraisal proceeding a court should take into account "all relevant factors."
Brief of Appellees, p. 23; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713. Significantly, however, the "all
relevant factors" language is contained in the Delaware appraisal statute but is not
contained in the Utah appraisal statute.
Utah courts have not by implication approved of inclusion of breach of fiduciary
duty claims in a shareholder appraisal proceeding for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty
unrelated to a merger. In Hogle v. Zinetic Medical Inc., 63 P.3d 80, (Utah 2002), cited
by the Groesbecks, the Utah Supreme Court looked at the behavior by the majority
shareholder that may have suppressed the value of minority shares in anticipation of the
merger. The Hogle court was concerned that the majority was making business decisions
in anticipation of and in an effort to facilitate a squeeze out of the minority shareholders.
Id. 85. '"[Insufficient evidence exists to support a conclusion that decisions made by the
Zinetics' Board of Directors [minority] while controlled by Synectics [majority] were
improperly made with an eye toward repressing the value of Zinetics until the minority
shareholders could be 'squeezed out."" Id. Further, the Hogle court's discussion of the
trial court's holding that the majority "did not suppress the value of Zinetics in
anticipation of the merger, then there is no presumption that short-term post-merger
gains were a result of the merger," Id. at 89 (emphasis added), suggests that Utah courts

may look at breach of fiduciary duty evidence in an appraisal but only such evidence that
is contemporaneous with the merger.
The common thread in all the breach of fiduciary cases cited by the Groesbecks is
that the breach of fiduciary duty claims occurred "in connection with the merger" or in
"relation to the merger." The breach of fiduciary duty claims in the aforementioned cases
all had a direct impact on the merger itself and were thus, as far as the courts were
concerned, inextricably linked to the fair appraisal of the shares in question. In contrast,
the Groesbecks5 alleged incidents of breach of fiduciary occurred many years ago and
there is no rational basis to link the alleged breach of fiduciary duty to the merger of New
Bingham Mary and Kennecott.
V.

GROESBECKS CONCEDE THAT SPECULATION IS NOT A PROPER
BASIS FOR DETERMINATION OF FAIR VALUE.
In part III of their brief Groesbecks characterize as "a clever slight of hand"

appellant's argument that Kennecott never would have agreed to pay $36 million to New
Bingham for another mining lease with New Bingham. Groesbecks go so far as to argue
that "the probability that a particular party (Kennecott) would have entered into a
transaction is not an element of fair value.5' Brief of Appellees, p. 39. Yet that is exactly
the type of evidence the trial court has relied upon. The trial court determined that New
Bingham management should have terminated the Lease and forced Kennecott to enter
into a new lease, for which Kennecott would have paid $36 million. R. 1141, f 34. That,
of course, never happened. Judging from the number of times the phrase "would have"
or "should have" appears in Groesbecks5 brief, this entire portion of Groesbecks5
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evaluation is an exercise in speculation, and reduces the appraisal process to a question of
which party's speculation is better. Appellant agrees with Groesbecks that what the
parties "would have" done many years ago should not be an element of fair value.
In support of its argument that Kennecott never would have paid so much money
to New Bingham, appellant in its opening brief referenced the 1985 sale between
Kennecott and Anaconda in which thousands of acres of land onto which the pit could be
expanded were sold for $5 million. The sale was an arm's length transaction between
two knowledgeable mining companies both acting in their own self interest. The trial
court did not consider the Anaconda sale in either its Memorandum Decision or Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Groesbecks in their brief at page 40 try to justify the
complete disregard of that material evidence by referring to the transaction as a sale for
"nuisance value" and showing that Anaconda sold other properties for low prices to get
out of the mining business. But the disparity between the value placed on New Bingham
by the court and the value placed on it by the Kennecott/Anaconda transaction is so
extreme that it would suggest that Anaconda gave away hundreds of millions of dollars.
For example, the court found that the value of New Bingham was approximately $36
million. Based simply upon the aerial photo of the Kennecott pit attached at Tab 6 to
appellant's opening brief, it appears for the sake of argument that at least 10 times more
property than is covered by the New Bingham claims, and which was included in the
Anaconda sale, was within the pit at the time of the merger. Employing the trial court's
logic, all of that property is as valuable as the New Bingham property because all of it
was used to expand the pit. If, as the court concluded, the New Bingham claims were

worth $36 million, then just the balance of the property included in the pit in the 1997
photo would have been worth ten times as much, or $360 million. The disparity between
the price Anaconda accepted for everything ($5 million) and the value of the property in
the pit in 1997 as appraised by the trial court (at least $360 million) is so extreme that it
cannot be explained by Anaconda's desire to get out of the mining business.
VL

THE COURT IMPROPERLY ANALYZED EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO
INTERPRET THE LEASE.
Groesbecks argue that the trial court properly admitted extrinsic evidence to

interpret the Lease. The law, however, requires that the court first determine that the
Lease is ambiguous, which it can do with the assistance of extrinsic evidence, and only at
that point can the court consider extrinsic evidence to interpret the lease. In the instant
case the court, without finding that the Lease is ambiguous, and with no reference to what
specific provisions of the Lease are ambiguous, simply moved directly to a review of
documentary evidence outside the Lease to conclude "that the Lease and assignment
thereof included stripping rights . . ." (R. 1137), but not for the purpose of obtaining
access to other ore.
Whether a contract provision is ambiguous is a matter of law. Yeargin v. Auditing
Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n., 20 P.3d 287, 297 (Utah 2001). The Utah test for
determining whether a contract is ambiguous is found in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers
Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995):
When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any
relevant evidence must be considered . . . . A judge should
therefore consider any credible evidence offered to show the
parties' intention . . . . If after considering such evidence the
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court determines that the interpretations contended for are
reasonably supported by the language of the contract, then
extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify the ambiguous
terms . . . . Conversely, if after considering such evidence,
the court determines that the language of the contract is not
ambiguous, then the parties' intentions must be determined
solely from the language of the contract.
Id. at 268.
In the instant action the trial court did not follow the process in Ward to determine
whether a contract is ambiguous. The trial court did not analyze the Lease to determine
whether certain provisions were capable of more than one reasonable interpretation as to
uncertain terms, missing terms, or facial deficiencies. Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 48
P.3d 941, 945 (Utah 2002) ("[a] contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more
than one reasonable interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings of terms, missing
terms, or other facial deficiencies.'").

Had it done so the trial court would have

determined that the broad grant of rights "to develop, extract, take, mine, save and sell
minerals from the Property, and to engage in related operations with respect to all veins,
lodes and mineral deposits contained in or on the Property" (Ex. 3, emphasis added) is
not ambiguous, particularly where Groesbecks' own expert conceded that surface mining
rights by necessary implication include stripping rights. R. 1194, p. 344. Groesbecks'
experts, significantly, rendered no opinion about the Lease. Groesbecks' argument now,
that language they wish had appeared in the Lease is in fact absent, does not make the
Lease ambiguous.

VII.

GROESBECKS FAIL TO RESPOND TO SIGNIFICANT EVIDENCE
CONCERNING THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF POTENTIAL LEGAL
CLAIMS.
In their response to appellant's argument concerning Groesbecks' substantial

knowledge of facts which might give rise to legal causes of action against the
management of the corporation, Groesbecks fail to respond to significant evidence of
their knowledge and also to respond to appellant's argument that they were at the very
least on inquiry notice of their claims.
The most glaring omission, and an event which the court failed to consider in its
Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, is the 1986
shareholder meeting.

At that meeting the Groesbecks and their legal counsel were

introduced to the new management of New Bingham, who were also employees of
Kennecott. Notes of the meeting (Ex. 12) reflect that there was a discussion of the sale
by Anaconda to Kennecott. Most significantly, the notes reflect that the management
advised shareholders that Kennecott "intended to mine across the claims for waste
removal and construction of roads." It is hard to imagine how notice of Kennecott's
intention to strip the waste from the New Bingham claims could more clearly have been
conveyed. Groesbecks also fail to address the information given to them by Kennecott at
their request during 1987. Among the information given to Groesbecks and their legal
counsel at meetings and in documents was a location map. Ex. 17. Instead, Groesbecks
can only point to a statement in the 1992 shareholder meeting minutes, made in response
to a question asked by another shareholder, about where the property is located,
indicating that "it is in the Oquirrh Mountains above and around the open pit." Ex. 22.
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Groesbecks ignore the fact that in the very next sentence of the minutes another
shareholder asked if a topical map was available and management responded that "one
was available and would be sent to all stockholders requesting it."
Groesbecks do not respond in their brief to authority offered by appellant that at
the very least such information was sufficient to put them on inquiry notice of their
claims, and that once on inquiry notice they were required to exercise due diligence to
inquire into the situation.

Groesbecks' failure to do so means the statute of limitations

was not tolled and the court erred in concluding that their claims were not time barred.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
For the reasons articulated above and in its opening brief, appellant requests that
the lower court judgment awarding compensation for "stripping rights" be reversed, and
the Groesbecks instead be awarded compensation based on the investment value of the
stock which they determined to be $3.50 per share, less $1.10 per share already paid, or a
total of $88,322.40, plus interest.
DATED this 30th day of August, 2004.
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JOHN B. WILSON
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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